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Contract Governance and the
Canadian Public Sector
SUZAN M. ILCAN
DANIEL M. O’CONNOR
MARCIA L. OLIVER
This essay examines the changing character of public sector
work in the Canadian federal public service context. It is based
on an empirical examination of various forms of contractual
relations currently operative within the Canadian state and on a
comparative approach of other western liberal state reform ini-
tiatives. We argue that contract governance is an ongoing process
involving distinct interrelations between the public and private
sectors. In this context, we identify various forms of contract
governance and flexibility schemes that have been enfolded
and refolded into the conventional structures of governance, and
unfolded into a liminal space between the state and civil society
through the establishment of nonstandard work and the creation
of alternative service delivery programmes.
In the current era of liberalism, many western states have retreated
from the provision of public welfare through the management of a stable,
merit-based labour force, instead choosing to concentrate on the provision
of public services through various contractual relations that promote flex-
ibility. This pattern of workforce governance has been termed “contract
government” (Dominelli and Hoogvelt 1996) or “control by contract”
(Marshall, Richardson, and Hopkins 1999). The shift from merit govern-
ance to contract government, or contract governance as we prefer to call
it, is a shift that reflects changes in the way business is done and work is
– ILCAN, S. M., and D. M. O’CONNOR, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
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managed beyond the state. Rather than analysing “government” in terms
of the state apparatus or state activities that are legitimated by parliament
or laws, governance centres on the many programmes or strategies that
seek to direct or shape the actions of others. Governance includes but
is not limited to programmes conducted by the liberal state, for it can
also involve the many voluntaristic ways we act upon ourselves (see also
Cruikshank 1999; Rose 1996, 1999; Larner and Walters 2000). The state
apparatus and the programmes conducted by the liberal state are elements
in a variety of complex assemblages of liberal governance.
The shift toward consumerism, downsizing, and lean production means
that more and more organizations, both within and beyond the liberal state,
rely on contractual arrangements and increasingly flexible workforces to
promote the efficiency and competitiveness deemed necessary in a global
marketplace. The growth in contract governance and the corresponding
demand for flexible working arrangements are indicative of the qualita-
tive shift in the regulation of workforce relations (O’Connor and Ilcan
2004). When these patterns of change find their way into domains of the
state, governments also become consumers, rather than producers, of
services and expert knowledge provided by private industry. While we ac-
knowledge these trends in liberal governance, current patterns of service
delivery and workforce transformation are not simply a reflex of external
changes. Rather than advancing a perspective forecasting the wholesale
transition of federal government services to the private sector, we examine
the processes of unfolding, enfolding, and refolding, as outlined by Dean
(2002), that take place between the liberal state and civil society. In this
context, we identify various forms of contract governance and increased
flexibilities that have been enfolded and refolded into the structures of
governance, and unfolded into a liminal space between the formal govern-
mental domain and civil society through the creation of special agencies
and alternative service delivery programmes. While Dean’s framework
provides us with an understanding of the relations between the liberal state
and civil society in terms of a series of “foldings,” our analysis
contextualizes and applies his framework to the reform initiatives of the
Canadian public sector. This analysis is also based on thirty field interviews
conducted with Canadian federal public service employees who work within
the formal and quasi-governmental domains of the federal government1
1. As part of an ongoing research project, the first two authors interviewed knowledge-
work professionals in the federal public service sector. Since this is a very difficult group
to study, a chain-referral technique was used to trace various dimensions of knowledge
work in this sector. This ascending methodology provided us with an expanding set of
potential contacts and proved especially useful in identifying and studying the group
dynamics of this transitory population. In accordance with ethical guidelines and to protect
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and on a comparative approach of other western liberal state reform initia-
tives, most notably the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., to high-
light the common rationalities and practices driving public sector
restructuring in terms of liberal governance.
LIBERALISM: INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE
AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This paper examines liberalism and liberal governance, not simply as
a normative philosophy or as an ideology but, as an assemblage of pro-
grammatic efforts aimed at managing social conduct (Rose and Miller
1992). These programmatic efforts consist of various rationalities and tech-
nologies, or theories and practices of rule. They are not undertaken merely
for reasons of the state, but on behalf of something external to the state
(Dean 2002: 40). Some researchers suggest that liberalism is often treated
as a residual category and more attention needs to focus on the differences
in the way liberalism is embodied in institutional design and social policy
within various countries (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). In light of
this concern, we understand liberalism not as representing a type of society
or state apparatus but rather as a formula of rule that shapes and informs
programmes and strategies of governance, making it possible to discern
core elements of contemporary liberal governance that underpin the
programmes and policies set out by western liberal states (Rose 1996).
Although it is possible to identify defining theories and practices of lib-
eral governance, the processes of public sector reform adopted by western
liberal states and sub-sectors are heterogeneous and complex. The pace of
public sector reform and the direction of change vary widely from country
to country according to political, economic, legal, and institutional factors.
It is well documented that the programmes of public sector reforms
launched in both the U.K. and New Zealand have been more comprehen-
sive than in other western liberal states (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000;
Dell’Aringa 2001; Borins 2002). The dramatic restructuring of the public
sector in each of these countries has been explained in terms of three in-
terrelated factors: both countries experienced strong economic pressure to
change, both had high-level political commitments to change, and both
had a clear set of ideas implying radical solutions (Borins 2002). Although
the confidence of our interviewees, we have made the transcribed interviews anonymous
by removing all names and references to specific departments, agencies, programmes,
and projects. In accordance with the national Tri-Council Statement on “Ethical Conduct
for Research Involving Humans,” this study received ethics clearance by the University
of Windsor’s research ethics board. The research herein has been supported by research
funds from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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deeply held political and ideological commitments developed to a lesser
degree in Canada (Aucoin 2002), intense economic pressure during the
late 1980s and early 1990s significantly influenced the further develop-
ment of liberal-based policies and programmes for public sector reform.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the degree of decentraliza-
tion in Canada’s political and administrative systems is particularly unu-
sual in comparison to other British Commonwealth nations. The political
and administrative systems of Canada are governed constitutionally, dic-
tating the separation of powers between the federal and provincial govern-
ments (Thompson 2001). Therefore, public sector reform in Canada is more
incremental and anti-doctrinal than the reforms undertaken in both New
Zealand and the U.K. The governments of the latter countries are charac-
terized by centralized political systems and relatively unrestrained consti-
tutional positions, thereby permitting the implementation of major reform
initiatives despite parliamentary opposition or dissent from the populace
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).
As a theory and practice of rule, liberalism emphasizes a minimal state
(Ericson, Barry, and Doyle 2000: 532–533) and yet constitutes forms of
governance deemed to operate beyond the state (Rose and Miller 1992).
In order to accomplish maximal governance with a minimal state, liberal-
ism, rather than simply enacting state regulations and laws, “employs tech-
niques and agencies located in civil society and thus must rely on
knowledge of economic, social and other processes outside the formal
sphere of the state” (Dean 2002: 42)—such as agencies of private govern-
ance that have grown in tandem with liberalism (Lippert and O’Connor
2003). For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) plays a prominent role in identifying ways to re-
structure the public service in industrial and “developing” countries. Its
liberal-based reform plans include the transfer of public organizations into
private hands, the introduction of market-like mechanisms of governance
into the provision of public services, the enfolding of private sector man-
agement practices aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness, and
the devolution of administrative responsibilities to lower levels of the gov-
ernment (Dell’Aringa 2001). These plans are promoted by the IMF and
the World Bank to stipulate the terms of financial assistance packages for
“developing” countries.2 Financial assistance from such international
lenders has been made contingent on adopting privatization initiatives to
reduce the size and role of the state and to increase competitiveness in
several countries, such as Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago (Rose, Chaison,
and de la Garza 2000).
2. See Ilcan and Phillips (2000, 2003) and Phillips and Ilcan (2003) for a critical analysis of
the ways in which other international agencies have attempted to govern groups,
populations, and economic activities in “developing” countries.
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One of the central, and much researched, aspects of liberalism is its
capacity to govern through freedom, that is, to create individuals who do
not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves (Rose 1996;
Larner and Walters 2000). Another central, but under researched, aspect
of liberalism is the way in which the state articulates with and implements
programmes of liberal governance. Dean (2002) has developed an analysis
which promises to bring about this articulation by examining the authori-
tarian dimensions of the limited sphere of the formal liberal state, brought
about by different conceptions of what is exterior to it, i.e., civil society.
Dean proposes a three-fold articulation (unfolding, enfolding, and refolding)
of the relation between the liberal state and civil society. The first is the
unfolding of the formal state into civil society and upon non-state agencies.
State organizations establish linkages with the commercial, local, and vol-
untary bodies found in civil society. This involves making the agents and
agencies of civil society more responsible and includes the downsizing/
outsourcing of formal state activities and the creation of various semi-
autonomous agencies to govern in civil society. The unfolding of the formal
state domain into civil society helps to allay the liberal concern “that the
state is doing too much governing” (Dean 2002: 42). To allay these
concerns, the Canadian government first adopted a system of merit gov-
ernance to separate the staffing of administrative, service delivery, policy
and research functions from the already existing formal government, and
later introduced equity measures to ensure the face of administrative gov-
ernance resembled working populations within civil society. Recently, it
has begun another phase of unfolding the administration of public life by
engaging in various forms of internal and external contractual relations
including the constitution of special agencies through processes of
government devolution.
The second is the enfolding of the processes of civil society into the
formal state domain. This involves the incorporation of values and modes
of conduct found in civil society. Recent changes, such as the market-testing
of government services, serve as a means of incorporating private sector
best practices for governing public sector business and work, and have, in
some venues, transformed the character or commitments of work relations
through the adoption of post-panoptical (Bauman 2000: 11) models of
contract governance. Under this regime, the market becomes the central
disciplinary mechanism for governing the conduct of individuals within
civil society by making, for example, their activities more responsive to
both consumer demands and management needs. Many of the perceived
rigidities associated with bureaucratic processes of the federal government
have been sidestepped by the enfolding of contract governance. In many
instances, bureaucratic processes are no longer conceived as the sole or
primary mechanism for shaping disciplinary practices in the provision of
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public services. The introduction of incentive structures based on systems
of competitive tendering and internal markets, the devolution of manage-
rial authority to the level of individual departmental agencies, and the
development of performance-related pay are contemporary modes of liberal
governance that work through market-based disciplinary practices in the
provision of public services. In this regard, contractual relations have pro-
duced new modes of governance that aim to promote the development of
certain human capacities, such as the capacity to be “autonomous” and
self-regulating (Yeatman 1996).
The third is the refolding of values and conduct found in civil society,
at least ideally, into the formal state domain. This involves replicating the
values and expectations, such as conditions of obligation, characteristic of
civil society and making these the basis for government programmes and
interventions by the liberal state (Dean 2002: 39–40). In this regard, contract
governance regimes seek to construct a new image for administering public
life, one that complements the liberal image of civil society as relations of
abstract individuals pursuing their own interest, coupled with various strat-
egies of governance that operate at a distance and aim to make individuals
and governmental agencies more responsible.
We suggest that these three folds are not necessarily sequential, nor
do they imply an historical development of the relation between the liberal
state and civil society. What is of concern is the specific articulations of
these folds that can be said to occur at any historical juncture. For our
purposes, these foldings of the liberal state and civil society provide a use-
ful analytic to explain the changing character of work relations in the
Canadian public sector.
FROM MERIT GOVERNANCE TO CONTRACT GOVERNANCE
Dating as far back as 1868, at a time when the Civil Service Act was
passed in Canada, the liberal state implemented merit as a governing prin-
ciple and practice in the provision of public services. Merit comprises a
set of programmatic efforts, that is, theories and practices of rule, aimed at
minimizing the role of nepotism in the administration of liberal welfare
and at making systems of rights and entitlements more inclusive for
marginalized populations. The Civil Service Act aimed to constitute a new
civil service whose employment relations would mirror the values and
conduct regulating civil societies’ mass production enterprises, communi-
cations, transportation, and wholesale trade and service industries (Carnoy,
Castells and Benner 1997). The employment relationship that prevailed in
Canada and elsewhere was characterized by full-time employment, for an
indefinite period, for a single employer who was primarily responsible for
 
626 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2003, VOL. 58, No 4
the conditions of employment. Normative stress on authority, order, pre-
dictability, and loyalty to the organization (Machado and Burns 1998: 365)
formed part of the long-term commitments and strategies of engagement
(Bauman 2000: 10) of new public sector management.
As part of this system of administering conduct, the Civil Service Act
was designed to ensure the appropriate qualifications of candidates for
positions in public departments by establishing classification schemes and
criteria for promotion through the ranks without unduly expanding gov-
ernment (Adie and Thomas 1987). In effect, the Act instituted the first Civil
Service Commission (CSC) that had the power of appointment and pro-
tection from undue influence. The majority of appointments were made
through restriction of access protocols (Baumann 2002), that is, through
open, competitive, job-related examinations. The principle of selection by
merit as established by competitive examination allowed civil servant po-
sitions to be distributed by merit and not by favour. As such, market-based
recruitment sought to minimize the political character of appointments in
liberal states and to promote a careerist orientation to public service. This
system established long-term commitments as the employment norm and
absorbed the costs associated with ongoing training.
In light of “new management realities,” several commissions were
appointed to analyse the organization and operation of the civil service.
The Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization (1962), in
particular, identified problems with the operation of the merit system, es-
pecially the excessive number of controls that resulted in long delays in
filling positions. In the name of efficiency, the Commission recommended
that government departments be given wide financial authority, be held
responsible for the management of resources at their disposal, and be au-
thorized to recruit and select their own staff for those positions with salaries
above a specific minimum amount per year (PSC 1972). The idea here
was to have merit vary according to one’s position in the hierarchy and to
“let managers manage,” a sentiment of liberal governance still espoused
by the Commission (PSC 1998: 10) and one that promotes the autonomy
and flexibility of managers with regard to public service staffing and
budgets (Chodos and Sulzner 1995: 98). In 1967, the Canadian Parliament
passed legislation incorporating several of the Glassco Commission recom-
mendations and implemented the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA).
Merit governance coordinated the administration of social welfare pro-
grammes by managing the distribution of skill-based public service work
through recruitment and promotion. But the effect was to produce a culture
of merit that precluded the mobility of many groups within civil society
from moving into the security of public service work. Since the 1970s,
and under the banner of “representative bureaucracy” and “employment
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equity representation,” numerous equity policies have been put in place
with the aim of increasing the representation of certain marginalized groups
to better reflect their employment distribution in the external labour market.
The ideal of making the public service bureaucracy mirror the external
labour market is another example of refolding civil society into the formal
state domain. That all federally regulated employers, such as financial
institutions and universities as well as those who contract with the govern-
ment, are required to do the same, exemplifies the unfolding of the state
into civil society. This also highlights the increasing responsibility placed
on individuals in civil society to govern their own conduct in ways that
align with the programmatic efforts of the liberal state.
While the new hybrid system of merit/equity aimed to promote the
representational profile of previously under-represented groups, it also made
staffing actions more cumbersome because of the many checks undertaken
to eliminate barriers. The response from public service managers was that
management needs were not being met and that a new system should be
put in place to move human resources to demand areas (according to
management protocols). A new section of the PSEA, section 34, now gives
deputy heads the exclusive authority to deploy employees from one group
and level in the public service to any other group or level by mutual agree-
ment of the employee and the recruiting manager (Chodos and Sulzner
1995). This amendment signals the incorporation of what is termed “func-
tional flexibility” (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi 2000: 140), that is, the ability
of organizations to distribute employee competencies across a range of
tasks.
The move to increase the flexibilities of organizational structures can
be seen as a derivative of the lean production system established by Toyota
in the auto industry as characterized by Womack, Jones, and Roos (1991).
One characteristic of the Toyota system is the reliance on multi-skilled
and “dynamic work teams” and the ability to assemble and move teams to
high activity or problem areas. In a rough approximation of this system, a
service sector in one government department is experimenting with a form
of flexible administration that involves assembling temporary project work
teams based on a “grid of employee expertise and interest.” The grid en-
compasses all employees in several directorates. When a project arises, a
team is assembled by matching people with activities and interests. Ac-
cording to an area manager, the grid is utilized to manage major projects:
“managers borrow some of my employees for a few months or for three
days a week to work on a specific project that they need to finish or imple-
ment quickly.” The degree of mobility promoted by these temporary work
teams requires a mode of governance to coordinate the activities and
responsibilities of individuals and managers. The use of “project charters”
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facilitates the coordination of employees from various functional areas of
expertise within the organization. These charters are contracts that deter-
mine the project plan, the scope of the project, its members, deliverables,
and the team leader responsible for the project. They enable functional flex-
ibility by contracting experts from the department and assembling them
into temporary groups on limited-term projects.
In another example of “contracting” for expertise within the federal
government, we found several instances of permanent government employ-
ees who were temporarily contracted to work in other departments on lim-
ited-term projects through a Memorandum of Understanding. A
Memorandum of Understanding is a contract for services between gov-
ernment departments. In these cases, the employee’s home department acts
like a temporary employment agency by supplying professional expertise
to government departments under contract. In line with private sector prac-
tices, temporary agencies enable governmental organizations to remake
themselves into consumers who purchase temporary services rather than
employers who hire permanent workers (Gonos 1997). While the enfold-
ing of temporary agency “practices” into the formal governmental domain
may signal a reversal of the long-standing practice of “growing” rather
than “buying” expertise, these “temporary” workers are also permanent
government employees. This hybrid status is said to entail certain advan-
tages, such as cost efficiency. According to one employee, “My depart-
ment works on cost recovery, so our fees are significantly lower than
industry. . . . For the [contracting] department, it is more cost efficient to
go to [my department] to get [my expertise].” The work of this employee,
and other employees whom we interviewed, involves moving from one
project to another, working in various work teams, in various departments.
The instances noted above illustrate some of the ways in which contract
governance works. In some administrative domains, it is possible, under
certain conditions, to contract-out work by means of project charters or
“temping” by means of Memorandums of Understanding without going as
far as tendering bids on the external market. These processes convey the
ways in which normative practices, typically associated with market-based
relations, have been enfolded, transformed, and refolded into the formal
governmental domain without directly involving private industry. In the
following section, we examine other deployments of contract governance
in both formal and quasi-governmental domains.
NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT AND ALTERNATIVE
SERVICE DELIVERY
Contract governance is part of a broad strategy to manage the risks of
market uncertainty by maximizing organizational flexibilities. This strategy
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for managing the risks associated with volatile and changing global markets
has led to the increasing employment of nonstandard labour in an effort to
achieve flexibilities (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi 2000) and to the rise of ide-
ologies that view labour flexibilities as the precondition of economic success
(Touraine 2001: 94). The management of risk through contracted, non-
standard employment is primarily a programme for shifting risks and un-
certainties to a newly constituted insecure working population and in so
doing, to externalize the risks associated with changing market demands
and unstable future funding levels (Sahin 2000; Peck and Theodore 1998;
Allen and Henry 1997; Hoggett 1996). The general willingness to experi-
ment with the terms and conditions of employment is an effort to regulate
the risks and uncertainties inadvertently created by market-based govern-
mental practices and global processes.
The shift to contract governance has led to a radical alteration in the
“character” of work relations (Sennet 1998) and work commitments
(Bauman 2000). The “strong-ties” (Granovetter 1973) or long-term stand-
ardized work “engagements” that characterized traditional relations of
labour and capital have been disengaged (Bauman 2001) and replaced with
weak ties and temporary work arrangements. What this means for work
and employment relations is that standardized secure employment scenarios,
premised on long term engagements between labour and management, are
becoming increasingly tenuous as patterns increasingly deviate “from the
tradition of lifelong full-time employment” (Ferrara, Hemerijck, and Rhodes
2001: 123).
Recent studies in the U.K. and Ireland found that the character of public
sector employment has shifted away from a traditional, permanent, pen-
sionable format (Morley, Gunnigle, and Haraty 1995: 49–56; Marshall,
Richardson, and Hopkins 1999; Green, Krahn, and Sung 1993; Dominelli
and Hoogvelt 1996). The U.K. public sector has tended to rely on non-
standard workers in an effort to reduce the role of the state in service de-
livery, to improve the efficiency of service provision, to move to a less
hierarchical form of organization that would allow greater private sector
involvement in service delivery (Marshall, Richardson, and Hopkins 1999),
and to promote flexibility in management. The use of temporary and
contingent employment in the U.S. is less pervasive in the public sector
than the private sector, most notably because of statutory prohibitions that
forbid contracting-out services traditionally performed by government
employees. Nevertheless, temporary appointments have been used by U.S.
public sector authorities to keep individuals working for extended periods
without the benefits and securities guaranteed to regular government
employees (Brock 2001) through union agreements.
The trend toward contract governance developed during the late 1980s
when private sector companies in North America and Europe followed a
 
630 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2003, VOL. 58, No 4
pattern of workforce adjustment designed to cut costs and produce lean
and efficient corporate enterprises. These cost cutting measures included
practices such as downsizing the workforce. However, downsizing alone
is limited. To redress the limits of these restructuring efforts and to com-
pensate for shortfalls in service delivery, many private and public sector
organizations have experimented extensively with strategies to increase
flexibilities buttressed by a range of contract governance options such as
outsourcing. These options are embedded in alternative service delivery
(ASD) programmes that aim to improve the delivery of government services
“to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community
groups and other entities” (Ford and Zussman 1997: 6).
The programmes of ASD encompass a broad range of implementation
methods for governing the delivery of public services. Such methods
include collaborative contract arrangements or partnerships both within the
federal government itself (i.e., between departmental units via MOUs and
project charters) and between the federal government and other levels of
government or the private sector. ASD programmes also involve the crea-
tion of special operating agencies and service agencies, and the use of
market-driven mechanisms (i.e., performance-pay incentives, competitive
tendering) in the delivery of programmes and services. The increasing shift
to alternative forms of service delivery not only preserves the core policy
and regulatory functions of the formal governmental domain but also real-
locates the implementation and delivery of public programmes to the most
appropriate service providers. The key objectives of ASD initiatives in-
clude improving service efficiency, increasing management flexibility and
autonomy, and developing partnership arrangements between the formal
liberal state and civil society in the design and delivery of public goods
and services. These goals are not to be understood as separate or distinct
from one another, but rather as indicative of the core elements of liberal
governance that shape the theories and processes of public sector restruc-
turing in western liberal states.
Outsourcing or “structural flexibility” (Chun 2001: 129) is an ASD
option and pattern of management that complements other strategies for
improving labour flexibilities, such as numerical flexibility, which is the
ability to expand and contract the workforce, and functional flexibility,
which entails enhancing the mobility of workers across operational tasks
and is oriented towards internal labour markets (Smith 1994). Outsourcing
has transformed many private and public sector organizations from pro-
ducers of goods and services to consumers where the “responsibility for
commissioning and purchasing services is separated from the responsibil-
ity for providing them” (Ahmed 1996: 81). These programmatic efforts
also found their way into public sector initiatives in Canada during the
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1990s. The transfer of activities and assets from the public to the private
sector can take several forms. For example, the government may transfer
responsibility for programme or service delivery to a private or not-for
profit organization and yet maintain policy, regulatory, and monitoring
roles. One example of this initiative is Navigation Canada, a non-profit
corporation owned by the users and employees of the air navigation sys-
tem (Zussman 2002). Alternatively, the government may abandon and sell
off a programme’s assets, such as in the cases of Air Canada and Petro-
Canada (Borins 2002; Thompson 2001). What is particularly striking is
that between 1985 and 1995, the Canadian government privatized 24 cor-
porations, including the “strategic repositioning” of Canada Post (White
and Janzen 2000: 41), which resulted in transferring approximately 80 thou-
sand employees to the private sector (Watters 1995: 51). Such liberal gov-
ernance efforts characterize other public service sectors. A recent
comparative study on public sector restructuring in western, industrialized
countries found that the privatization of state-owned enterprises is most
comprehensive in the U.K. and New Zealand (Borins 2002). For example,
in 1990, Britain’s Conservative government sold 47 state-owned enter-
prises, including British Petroleum, British Steel, and British Airways.
These trends have led to the rapid unfolding of the responsibility for public
security to private corporate entities that have spread into the spaces left
in the wake of a receding state (Rigakos 1999: 383, 389).
GOVERNING AT A DISTANCE
While outsourcing service delivery to the private sector is inseparable
from the trends of contract governance, this is only one form of govern-
ance structure in the repertoire of current liberal-state governments. The
Canadian government is currently experimenting with other alternative,
though related, governance structures. In addition to those previously men-
tioned (i.e., memoranda of understanding, project charters, and
outsourcing), the current formal government has also “devolved” several
special agencies to govern at a distance. Formed at the juncture of the liberal
problematic of “too much governing,” the necessity to respond to the de-
mands for flexibility, and the need to manage the potential opportunism of
contracted firms, the government has unfolded several key government
services to special agencies.
The creation and establishment of semi-autonomous governmental
agencies encompass two distinct types in the Canadian federal government:
special operating agencies and service agencies. In Canada, eighteen special
operating agencies (SOAs) exist (Zussman 2002) and employ almost five
percent of the public service (Borins 2002: 12). These agencies fall along
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a continuum between a line department and an arm’s length agency; they
are situated within a particular department, and hence are subject to public
policy and accountability standards of the ministerial department, and, at
the same time, are granted negotiated flexibilities, such as management
flexibilities in allocating and reallocating departmental resources. Unlike
executive agencies in Britain and minister-chief executive relations in New
Zealand, the administrative heads of SOAs do not report directly to the
minister but rather function under the administrative authority of a host
departmental deputy (Zussman 2002).
The creation of (SOAs) in Canada is based on theoretical models and
reform initiatives adopted by governments in several other countries, most
notably New Zealand and the U.K. (Zussman 2002). The reform of New
Zealand’s core public sector involved dividing large departments into
smaller units with specialized functions. The State Owned Enterprises Act
(1986) sought to establish government-owned trading organizations as
successful businesses along private sector lines (Pollitt and Bouckaert
2000), with managers exercising a broad degree of autonomy and flexibil-
ity in managing resources that is comparable to the private sector (Walsh,
Harbridge, and Crawford 2001). The separation of policy-making func-
tions from operational functions was further formalized through the State
Sector Act (1988). Operating agencies became formally separate from the
responsibilities of ministries (e.g., to provide policy advice to ministers)
and chief executives became the managers of their own departmental staff
and were given greater autonomy and flexibility over appointments, pro-
motions, and dismissals (Borins 2002). Likewise, in the U.K., under the
Next Steps programme (1988), the government created service-oriented
“executive agencies” operating at arm’s-length from departments with
substantial managerial autonomy. Within ten years of the programme’s
establishment, more than 140 executive agencies had been created and em-
ployed nearly three quarters of the public service in Britain (Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2000; Aucoin 2002).
In response to pressures to reduce expenditures and improve service
efficiency, and in situations where the scope of service mandate is beyond
the SOA model, service agencies have been created in the Canadian federal
government. Examples of service agencies include the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA), the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, and
Parks Canada. Unlike SOAs, service agencies are established under legis-
lation and, in turn, are granted statutory flexibilities. These flexibilities
permit greater staffing authority, the right to enter into partnering arrange-
ments with other levels of government or the private or third sectors, and
the ability to retain revenue (Zussman 2002). Enhanced flexibilities in the
area of staffing enable service agencies to move away from the “old public
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service regime” based on the “order of merit” to a new flexible regime
based on minimum standards within a candidate pool, and other criteria
such as best fit with the organization, relocation costs, productiveness, and
efficiency. In effect, service agencies are made responsible for the recruit-
ment and marketing of the organization. From the new public manage-
ment point of view, this allows the agency to separate itself from the
cumbersome staffing regime of the PSEA and the brand of the public
service:
Before we were linked with the public service. We had their application forms
. . . you had to advertise through the Public Service Commission and had to
make your advertising tied to public service work. They had to approve our
ads and so on. . . . Now we have flexibility to go directly to [potential em-
ployees] and to advertise and recruit. . . . Now we can say we’re [Agency X],
we’re not the public service. I think it’s given us a distinct image . . . where
people see us as a separate entity, moving away from that stodgy [public
service] image.
Having the status of a service agency allows agencies to unfold their own
brand in the labour market; it allows the agency to separate itself, at least
symbolically, from the image of public service and to market itself like a
private sector firm.
The governance structures of both SOAs and service agencies have
changed under the framework of ASD as they have enfolded both prac-
tices and personnel from beyond the liberal state. The most senior officials
of service agencies, that is, those who form their “boards of management,”
are recruited largely from the private sector and are comparable to the
boards of directors in private corporations. Similarly, the creation of a
Senior Executive Service in Australia, under the Public Service Reform
Act (1984), aimed at making recruitment to senior public service appoint-
ments more open and competitive. Executive agencies in both the U.K.
and New Zealand are headed by chief executives who are hired through a
process of open competition and appointed on a fixed-term contract of up
to five years. By 1997, approximately one third of executive agencies in
the U.K. had chief executives hired from outside the civil service (Borins
2002). The appointment of private sector managers to high-profile posi-
tions in the public service reflects the enfolding of private sector best prac-
tices and personnel, through market-based mechanisms, into the provision
of public services in many western liberal states. This is further exempli-
fied by the increasing client-based and consumer-driven rationales that
guide the activities and standards of management. In line with private sec-
tor best practice, boards of management are said to have a different man-
agement orientation, an orientation that is different from the public servant’s
“mind set,” one that emphasizes efficiency in terms of clients and
consumers, performance indicators, and business plans.
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MARKETING PUBLIC SERVICES
In several western, industrial countries, initiatives to raise the quality
of public services have led to a wider scope of performance measurements,
focussing more on results and outputs rather than on inputs and internal
processes. In Canada, the 1994 Declaration of Service Quality and the 1995
Quality of Services Initiative specify particular accountability measures,
such as the production of annual business plans, multi-year strategic plans,
and yearly reports addressing predetermined performance standards
(Zussman 2002). Under the U.K.’s Citizens’s Charter (1991), departments
and agencies are required to publish explicit service standards and results
detailing whether those standards are being met. In the U.S., the Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act (1993) effectively mandated perform-
ance indicators for every federal agency (Radin 1998). Over 4000 standards
for 570 departments are now in place (Borins 2002). The attempts of vari-
ous liberal-state governments to implement performance indicators in the
delivery of public services reflect a mode of liberal governance steered by
the logic of the market. The devolution of management and the increasing
use of performance measures, market-testing, and competitive tendering
in the governance of public service delivery introduce new techniques of
political control, such as those of monitoring, audit, and regulation (Rose
1996; Isin 2000; Peck 2001).
Recent state policies in Britain and Australia require public service
agencies to compete with private sector organizations for contracts in
delivering government services and programmes. These policies and prac-
tices of compulsory competitive tendering, “best-value,” and “market-
testing” suggest that the “special agency” can be a transitional and
short-lived organizational form. Once given the opportunity to act as in-
dependent agents, the activities of agencies can be “market-tested,” that
is, subject to the so-called “disciplining effects of competition” (Kleiman
and Sahu 1999: 156). Under market-testing policies, quasi-government
agencies, and even formal government departments, are forced to bid for
the services they provide alongside private sector companies. The threat
of substituting in-house production with that of outside agencies requires
in-house providers to demonstrate strategies for increasing efficiency and
disseminating “best practices” (Braddon and Foster 1996: 104–105).
In the Canadian context, market-testing of programmes and services
is an option currently the subject of experimentation in conventional de-
partmental structures. For example, one federal government department
contracts out part of a government programme to a private sector partner
firm, while the rest of the programme remains in-house, at least for the
time being. One senior manager explains:
 
635CONTRACT GOVERNANCE AND THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
[Programme X] is done half internally by [departmental] employees and half
externally by private agencies. We do that on purpose. Now our goal is to
assess and evaluate who does what best and at the end of a couple years we’re
going to make a decision. We’ll move all the business in-house, or we’ll move
it all out, or we’ll go to a combination . . . there’s a lot of options right now.
Turning liberal welfare agencies into “purchasers who can choose to
buy services from a range of options available” (Rose 1993: 296) has the
potential to transform agents of the formal government into powerful con-
sumers. The implication of these decisions will be profound for the char-
acter of working relations within and outside the formal governmental
domain. As this case illustrates, the business of providing government serv-
ices could remain in-house, it could be contracted to a private firm, or be
involved in some combination of in-house and outsourced delivery mecha-
nism. Even if projects remain in-house, the form of governance that will
manage them will be contractual. The option of delivering services through
service agreements is an alternative form of contractual relations within
the variety of contract governance mechanisms currently available within
liberal governance.
The increasing reliance on contract governance and the use of mar-
ket-like mechanisms in public service provision necessitates an assessment
of accountability. It has been claimed that “good contracting arrangements
stimulate beneficial changes including clarification of purpose, role clari-
fication, task specification, reliable reporting of information, and freedom
to manage” (Matheson 1997: 164). From this standpoint, the public service
is considered to be more responsive to citizens and clients of governmen-
tal programmes, and much more cost efficient under conditions where ac-
countability is increased through publicly available government business
plans and by a management style that is market-based and results-driven.
However, such a market-based management style is risky because of the
potential for opportunism and reductions in the quality of public services
offered. Following Tupper (2001), this explains why the public service can
be viewed as understaffed, operating under questionable management prin-
ciples, and, in turn, incompetent of developing and implementing effec-
tive public policy.
CONCLUSION
Although the provision of public services is undergoing profound
changes in Canada, it would be misleading to assume that the formal gov-
ernmental domain has abandoned direct responsibility for traditional ac-
tivities, such as health care, social assistance, and public education. Apart
from the traditional activities of the Canadian state, it would seem that it
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has become an option, even desirable, to have Canadian government de-
partments act as oversight agencies whose primary task will be to mediate
the relations between a receding formal governmental domain and short-
term contract service providers. These contract service providers can even
be gleaned from other government departments. There is a range of possible
and documented alternatives to deliver government services, but most, if
not all, fall under the rubric of contract governance. Although contract
governance has been claimed to have the potential to ease fiscal strain and
to increase organizational competitiveness and efficiency, it raises new
problems for workforce governance. In particular, the functions of the
formal government are transformed from implementing policies and serv-
ices to managing and auditing multiple contracts of relatively autonomous
entities. With the increasing emphasis on performance and flexibility,
contract governance also challenges the integral characteristics of organi-
zational networks, specifically innovation and new learning and interac-
tion processes. Long-term contractual relationships between the formal
governmental domain and semi-autonomous or private agencies are char-
acterized not by trust, but rather by strict control and contract enforcement.
By separating policy formation from policy implementation, a variety of
formal governments gain considerable control over the content of the
contract and are able to establish more rules and incentives for compliance.
In several western liberal state reform initiatives, the deployment of
contract governance as an option for delivering services is a function
of the unfolding, enfolding, and refolding of normative practices between
the formal apparatus of the state and civil society. In the Canadian con-
text, merit governance promotes a professional, permanent workforce that
mirrors the composition of specialist workforces beyond the state. It is
bound to the mundane work of managing bureaucratic processes. Contract
governance, on the other hand, emphasizes the development and deploy-
ment of flexible, short-term work teams and is closely associated with the
management of fixed-duration projects. It lends itself to the unfolding of
public service work through the formation of special agencies, market-test-
ing, and perhaps the eventual outsourcing of public service work beyond
the formal governmental domain. For now, it is clear that both governance
regimes coexist within government departments, and even within specific
programme areas. What is also clear is that a reliance on ASD options pro-
motes the development of nonstandard, flexible working relations that are
different in kind from the relations established under the merit model of
governance. In its various guises—as project charters, memorandums of
understanding, service agreements with internal or external service pro-
viders, or special agencies—contract governance is an alarming trend in
the work of doing public sector work, a trend brought about through the
folding of liberal governance.
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RÉSUMÉ
La gestion des contrats gouvernementaux et le secteur public
canadien
L’époque actuelle marquée par le libéralisme a vu beaucoup de pays
occidentaux retirer leur offre d’aide sociale en recourant à la gestion d’une
main-d’œuvre stable et fondée sur le mérite, pour la remplacer par une
offre de services publics faisant appel à diverses relations contractuelles
favorisant la flexibilité. À la lumière de ces changements, cet essai aborde
la régulation des contrats dans le secteur de la fonction publique du Canada
en particulier et dans d’autres secteurs publics libéraux de l’Occident en
général. Il examine comment le travail a été transformé par la gestion
gouvernementale des contrats, c’est-à-dire par des aménagements
contractuels qui visent à gérer les risques de l’incertitude du marché en
optimisant la flexibilité organisationnelle. Nous illustrons la manière dont
la gestion des contrats entretient une frontière commune avec la dé-
standardisation du travail, le développement d’une main-d’œuvre flexible,
les aménagements de sous-traitance et la décentralisation des ministères
au sein du secteur public canadien et à l’extérieur de ce dernier.
Notre analyse s’appuie sur trente entrevues sur le terrain effectuées
avec les fonctionnaires du service public au niveau fédéral, ces derniers
travaillant à l’intérieur du domaine formel ou quasi-gouvernemental du
gouvernement fédéral. Dans notre étude, nous nous inspirons d’autres
initiatives de réforme étatique du monde occidental et libéral, plus
particulièrement de celles du Royaume-Uni, de l’Australie, de la Nouvelle-
Zélande et des États-Unis, en les utilisant comme points de comparaison
pour mettre en évidence les raisonnements et les pratiques influençant la
restructuration du secteur public et les rapports avec la force de travail.
Au lieu de considérer le libéralisme simplement comme une
philosophie normative ou une idéologie et en retenant les travaux de Rose
et Miller (1992), nous le percevons avec la gouverne libérale comme un
amalgame d’efforts programmés visant à encadrer la conduite sociale. Ces
efforts programmés se présentent sous forme de rationalités, de techno-
logies ou de théories et de pratiques qui ont force de règle. Ils ne sont pas
entrepris simplement pour des raisons d’État, mais au nom de quelque chose
qui est extérieur à l’État (Dean 2002). Des chercheurs insinuent que le
libéralisme est souvent considéré comme une catégorie résiduelle et qu’il
faut accorder plus d’attention aux différences dans la façon dont le
libéralisme est intégré à la structure institutionnelle et à la politique sociale
de divers pays. Dans la même foulée, nous envisageons le libéralisme non
pas comme la représentation d’un type de société ou d’un appareil étatique,
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mais plutôt comme un mode de gouvernance qui façonne et informe les
programmes et les stratégies des gouvernements, de façon qu’on puisse
reconnaître les éléments clef de la gouvernance libérale contemporaine qui
sous-tend les politiques et les programmes mis de l’avant par les états
libéraux de l’Occident (Rose 1996). Bien qu’il soit possible d’identifier
les théories et les pratiques déterminantes de la gouvernance libérale, les
processus de réforme du secteur public retenu par les états libéraux
occidentaux et leurs composantes demeurent complexes et hétérogènes.
Le rythme de la réforme du secteur public et la direction du changement
varient largement d’un pays à un autre selon des facteurs d’ordre politique,
économique, légal et institutionnel.
Comme une conséquence de la compréhension libérale du gouverne-
ment comme une sphère circonscrite, nous laissons entendre que l’État
opère par des modes de régulation qui se trouvent à l’extérieur de sa sphère
et par des modes de régulation qui ont cours au sein de la société civile.
Dans ce contexte, nous reconnaissons différents modes d’administration
des contrats et une présence de flexibilité accrue, qui ont été intégrés aux
structures de la gouvernance publique et qui ont été redéployés dans un
espace restreint entre la sphère gouvernementale formelle et la société civile
par le biais de l’élaboration d’aménagements non habituels du travail et
par des programmes alternatifs de fourniture de services. Nous soutenons
que le glissement vers la consommation de masse, la réduction de la taille
de l’État et la production allégée se traduisent par de plus en plus
d’organisations, tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de l’État libéral, qui font
appel à des arrangements contractuels et à des types de main-d’œuvre de
plus en plus flexibles, cela afin d’accroître l’efficacité et la capacité
concurrentielle jugées nécessaires dans un contexte de mondialisation des
marchés.
Par le moyen d’une analyse des changements récents apportés aux
secteurs publics canadien et à d’autres de l’hémisphère occidental libéral,
nous montrons la façon dont la gouvernance des contrats fait partie d’une
immense stratégie visant à réduire les incertitudes du marché et à maximiser
la flexibilité des organisations. Cette stratégie de gestion des risques,
inhérents aux marchés mondiaux volatiles et changeants, a amené le re-
cours à une main-d’œuvre atypique dans un effort d’atteindre la flexibilité
(Zeytinoglu et Muteshi 2000) et elle a entraîné une montée des idéologies
qui considèrent la flexibilité de la main-d’œuvre comme un préalable à la
réussite économique (Touraine 2001 : 94). La gestion du risque par le
moyen d’une main-d’œuvre atypique et contractuelle constitue avant tout
un programme visant à déplacer les risques et les incertitudes vers une
population active récemment constituée et insécure. En ce faisant, le
programme cherche à externaliser les risques associés aux demandes
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changeantes du marché et aux niveaux de financement futurs et instables
(Sahin 2000 ; Peck et Theodore 1998 ; Allen et Henry 1997 ; Hoggett 1996).
La volonté générale d’expérimenter ces conditions d’emploi apparaît
comme un effort en vue de réguler les risques et les incertitudes engendrés
par des pratiques d’administration publique qui s’appuient sur le marché
et des processus globaux. Les tentatives par divers gouvernements libéraux
de mettre en œuvre des indicateurs de performance dans les services publics
traduisent un mode de gouvernance libérale s’inspirant de la logique du
marché. La délégation de la gestion et le recours grandissant à des mesures
de rendement, au test de marché et à l’offre concurrentielle dans la gouverne
de la fourniture des services publics amènent de nouvelles techniques de
contrôle politique, tels que celles du « monitoring », de la vérification et
de la régulation. Dans l’ensemble, nous soutenons que l’administration de
contrats – dans leurs diverses manifestations comme des chartes de projet,
des mémoires d’entente, des accords de service avec des fournisseurs
internes ou externes, des commissions spéciales – constitue une tendance
alarmante dans la façon de fournir un service public, une tendance qui a
été alimentée par le repliement de la gouvernance libérale.
 
